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This paper studies the effect that changing demographic patterns have had on the household saving
rate in China. We undertake a quantitative investigation using an overlapping generations (OLG) model
where agents live for 85 years. Consumers begin to exercise decision making when they are 18. From
age 18 to 60, they work and raise children. Dependent children’s utility enter into parent’s utility where
parents choose the consumption level of the young until they leave the household. Working agents
give a portion of their labor income to their retired parents and save for their own retirement while
the aged live on their accumulated assets and support from their children. Remaining assets are bequeathed
to the living upon death. We parameterize the model and take future demographic changes, labor income
and interest rates as exogenously given from the data. We then run the model from 1963 to 2009 and
find that the model accounts for nearly all the observed increase in the household saving rate.
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In 2008, the household saving rate in China surpassed 27 percent. The 27 percent ﬁgure, certainly
high by international standards, is also high in comparison to their own saving in earlier periods.
From 1959 to 1977 for example, the household saving rate averaged only 3.9 percent, lower in
comparison to an average of 8.9 percent observed in the US over the same period. The transition
from low to high saving in China began around 1978, corresponding to the initiation of market-
based economic reforms. In addition to a changing economic landscape, large demographic changes
from a predominantly young to an older population were simultaneously taking place. Fertility
rates of almost 6 children per woman as late as 1967 declined to under 2 by the mid-1990s and
the fraction of children (ages 0-17) as a fraction of parents (ages 18-60) halved from 0.73 to 0.36.
Also, rising life expectancies increased the number of the aged (ages 61-85) per worker (ages 18-60)
from 0.14 to 0.17 and is projected to accelerate to 0.39 by 2030.
This paper examines the role played by the changing demographics on the time-path of house-
hold saving in China from 1963 to 2008. We undertake a quantitative investigation using an
overlapping generations (OLG) model where agents live for 85 years. Consumers begin to exercise
decision making when they are 18. From age 18 to 60, they work and raise children. Dependent
children’s utility enters into parent’s utility where parents choose the consumption level of the
young until they leave the household. Working agents give a portion of their labor income to their
retired parents and save for their own retirement. The aged live on their accumulated assets and
support from their children while remaining assets are bequeathed to the living upon death.
Our set-up allows demographic variations to aﬀect the saving rate through more than one
channel. First, the household saving rate is inversely related to the fertility rate. Having fewer
“mouths to feed” raises the availability of resources that can be saved for the future. Second, due to
the importance of children as a source of retirement income, the decline in the number of children
by the working generation promotes saving as they must rely more on savings for retirement in
comparison to previous generations. Finally, saving also increases a a result of a composition eﬀect;
a large portion of saving tends to occur between the ages of 40 to 65 and China has witnessed a
growth in this cohort over the past 30 years.
Our analysis also allows variation in wages and interest rates to aﬀect the saving rate. We
parameterize the model and take future demographic changes, labor income, and interest rates as
exogenously given from the data. We then run the model from 1963 to 2009 and ﬁnd that the
model can account for nearly all the observed increase in the household saving rate.1
The high household saving rate in China has generated the attention of many researchers. Some
authors have investigated clever and nonstandard channels. Wei and Zhang (2009) hypothesize
that the male sex imbalance, resulting from a Chinese cultural preference for sons and the one-
child policy of population control, is the driving force in raising the saving rate. They argue that
families with one son compete for a spouse in the marriage market through wealth accumulation
and that the intensity of this wealth competition has increased in recent years as the sex ratio has
1Data exists beginning in 1953 but we begin our simulations in 1963 to avoid extreme outcomes associated with
the Great Leap Forward and the Great Famine (1961).
2become more imbalanced. While the “excess male” hypothesis predicts lower saving by parents of
daughters, Banerjee et al. (2010) report evidence that saving by these households is higher than by
parents of sons. Their explanation is that due to the cultural convention that sons (not daughters)
will provide for parents in old age, parents of daughters need to save more so as to provide for
themselves in their retirement.2
Our paper does not distinguish agents by gender and is more closely related to the empirical
studies of Modigliani and Cao (2004) and Horioka and Wan (2007) who investigate life-cycle
determinants of saving. These authors show that China’s age structure and saving rate have been
related over a 50 year period, but they rely on a form of the dependency ratio in reduced form
regressions and do not control for the entire population distribution. In our paper the entire age
distribution, both current and future, have an impact on the saving decision.
Other work that employs the OLG framework to study saving include Ferrero (2010), who
ﬁnds an important role for demographics in explaining the long run trend in US saving relative to
other G6 countries; Krueger and Ludwig (2007) show the importance of demographic change in a
multi-country OLG model; Chen et al. (2006) argue that the decline in population growth has had
only a small eﬀect on the Japanese saving rate; and Song and Yang (2010) study the eﬀects of a
ﬂattening of the age-earnings proﬁle on Chinese household saving. Two dimensions along which our
paper diﬀers from these, however, is that we allow consumption by children to enter directly into
household utility as in the Barro and Becker (1989) model and that we allow an explicit bequest
motive. Our paper also makes contact with the broader literature on how demographic changes
aﬀect the macro-economy. Shimer (2001) details how the age distribution impacts unemployment
rates; Feyrer (2007) relates demographic change to productivity growth; and Jaimovich and Siu
(2009) and Lugauer (2010) connect the age distribution to the magnitude of business cycles.
The economic importance of China in the world economy is diﬃcult to overstate. Simply by
virtue of China’s 1.3 billion people its economy is very large and has overtaken Japan as the
world’s second largest in terms of aggregate GDP. The saving rate in China exceeds that of nearly
every other country, and Chinese savings have been used to purchase large amounts of assets
denominated in US dollars. The US current account deﬁcit with China was nearly $270 billion in
2008, about 2% of US GDP. The high household saving rate in China helps make these gigantic
capital ﬂows possible.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the data that
underlies our analysis. Section 3 presents the model used in the quantitative analysis. Parame-
terization of the model is discussed in Section 4, the main results are presented in Section 5, and
Section 6 concludes.
2See also Chaman and Prasad (2010) who argue that saving has responded to provide for a rising private burden
of expenditures on housing, education and health care.
32 The data
The historical and projected demographic estimates come from the United Nations World Popu-
lation Prospects. The Chinese household saving rate data comes from Modigliani and Cao (2004)
and various issues of the China Statistical Yearbook. We report and use the available information
as provided by these sources and without modiﬁcation.3
Figure 1 plots the household saving rate (household saving divided by household income) in
China from 1963 to 2009 that we seek to understand. The saving rate hovered around 5 percent
until 1978 when it began accelerating. The post 1978 high-saving rate regime, though, is punc-
tuated by sizeable ﬂuctuations. In a short 6 year span between 1978 and 1984, the saving rate
increased by 15 percentage points, fell to 10 percent in 1985 to 1988, then resumed more or less a
steady upward trend.
To place the saving rate in the international context, Table 1 shows household saving as a
percent of GDP for ﬁve countries in 2004. Recent Chinese household saving has been high even in
comparison to its Asian neighbors Japan and Korea.
Table 1: Household Saving as a Percent of GDP in 2004
China USA France Japan Korea
Saving Rate 18.5 5.1 10.9 6.2 8.0
Figure 2 illustrates the magnitude of the changes in China’s age distribution. In this ﬁgure,
the ratio of the population aged 0 to 17 to the number aged 18 to 60 (labeled young to working)
provides us with a measure of family size. Family size is relatively ﬂat until 1975 then falls steadily
through 2009. The other series is the old-age dependency ratio (aged 60 to 85 relative to working
aged). The old-age dependency ratio begins to rise around 1990 and is projected to trend upwards
sharply after 2009. The current working age population has relatively few retirees to support,
but when the current workers retire, there will be relatively few workers to support them. The
dramatic change comes from the decline in fertility and also an increase in the average life span.
3See Curtis and Mark (2010) for more about Chinese data and studying China using standard economic models.
4Table 2: Total Fertility Rates
Year China USA Japan
1950-54 6.1 3.4 3.0
1955-59 5.5 3.7 2.2
1960-64 5.6 3.3 2.0
1965-69 5.9 2.5 2.0
1970-74 4.8 1.8 2.1
1975-79 2.9 1.8 1.8
1980-84 2.6 1.8 1.8
1985-89 2.0 1.9 1.7
1990-94 1.8 2.0 1.5
1995-99 1.8 2.0 1.4
2000-04 1.8 2.0 1.3
2005-09 1.8 2.1 1.3
To place China’s fertility rate in the international context, Table 2 shows fertility rates for
China, the US, and Japan. Chinese women had a fertility rate of over 6 between 1950 to 1954,
but now this ﬁgure is even lower than of the U.S. The variations in China’s fertility rate are
due in large part to the government’s policy on family planning. As is well known, China’s one-
child policy was implemented in 1979 and oﬃcially remains in eﬀect although enforcement varies
among jurisdictions and rural and urban areas. Perhaps lesser known is that various (although less
eﬀective) fertility reduction programs had been implemented since at least 1964. As can be seen,
fertility rates had already begun to decline in response to the 1971 “Later-Longer-Fewer” campaign
where the suggestion was for two children in urban areas and three in rural areas (Kaufman et al
(1989)).4
Figure 3 illustrates how closely the household saving rate and the working age proportion of
the population move together. This makes sense since only people who are earning income can
save, and the majority of income for the majority of people will be labor income. But in addition
to this composition eﬀect, the working aged population corresponds in age, roughly to households
with dependent children. Over the sample, the proportion of working cohorts is rising at the same
time that family size is falling which provides a second channel for the saving rate to rise.
Figure 4 plots the saving rate with the log real wage which we calculate as the annualized
marginal product of labor. The wage shows substantial volatility in the 1960s, reﬂecting the hard
times associated with the Great Famine. The wage has an apparent trend break in 1978 where
wages grow faster in the post reform period. The relatively low wage growth before 1978 should
tend to induce a higher saving rate and the relatively high wage growth after 1978 should induce a
lower saving rate. Ex ante, the dynamics of labor income seem to work against the way a successful
model would work to account for the data.
4In our quantitative analysis, the age distribution is assumed to be exogenously determined. The strong response
of fertility to policy provides some justiﬁcation for this assumption.
5To summarize, the correlation between the large increase in the saving rate and the dramatic
demographic transition represents the main stylized fact we wish to explore. Standard life cycle
considerations predict that household saving should increase in response to exogenously mandated
reductions in family size because (a) fewer mouths to feed frees up resources that can be saved
and (b) looking ahead at fewer children to help provide for old age means people need to save
more for retirement. Additionally, we should observe that the household saving rate is increasing
in the proportion of the working age population simply through changes in the composition (or
share) of life-cycle savers. Finally, high labor income growth should work to depress the saving
rate whereas low income growth should encourage greater saving. The pattern of income growth
and demographics (low income growth, large families, relatively few working age before 1978 and
the reversal after 1978) seen in the data inﬂuence the saving decision in diﬀerent directions. To
sort out these eﬀects and to examine which ones dominate, we turn to the OLG model.
3 An Overlapping Generations Model of Saving
We work with a partial equilibrium model consisting of decision making households of cohort age
ranging from 18 to 85. A representative ﬁrm employs all working age agents and pays them the
market wage which is given by the marginal product of labor. A national ﬁnancial intermediary
clears excess supply or demand for capital on the international market. The age distribution, wage,
and interest rate are given exogenously, and all agents know the current and future values.
3.1 Consumers
Consumers live 85 periods or years. At any point in time, 85 generations are present but only
those aged 18 to 85 make decisions. The population is classiﬁed into 4 not necessarily disjoint
groups: Children (age 0 to 17); workers (age 18 to 60) who are also the parents of the dependent
children; adult children (age 35 to 60), a subset of the working age population who are the children
of the retired; and retirees (age 61 to 85). Let Nc
t ,Nw
t ,Nac
t , and Nr
t be the number of people
in these respective groups at time t and let Nt be the total population. For the ﬁrst 17 years,
people live as children and are dependent upon their parents. They do not save and consume
what their parents choose for them. Parental and children’s consumption enter separately into
parental utility, as in Barro and Becker (1989). People work and earn labor income from ages 18
to 60. During retirement, people live oﬀ their accumulated assets and transfers received from their
working adult children. People die with certainty at age 85. In the last year of life, utility depends




t be the consumption of the decision making cohorts i ∈ [18,85]. Individuals in cohorts
i ∈ [18,60] have nt = Nc
t /N w
t dependent children living with them, each of whom consume
6in the amount c
c,i
t . During the parenting years, agents choose their own consumption ci
t,t h e i r
dependent children’s consumption c
c,i
t ,a n da s s e t sa
i+1
t+1 to take into the next period. They also



















t+1 =( 1− τt)wt +( 1+rt)ai
t + Bi
t , i ∈ [18,60]. (1)
where Bi
t =0for i ∈ [18,34] and Bi
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t τtwt is the per retiree transfer received from adult children. Asset holdings are
required to be non negative (consumers are not allowed to borrow).
3.1.2 Preferences
During those years in which parents make decisions for children, we follow Barro and Becker (1989)





























,i ∈ [18,60] (3)
where µ<1 and η<1 determine the degree to which parents care for their children and 1
σ > 0
is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. These are interpreted as single-parent households
each with n = Nc/N p dependent children.
In the last year of life, utility is deﬁned over consumption for that year c85
t and assets a85
t+1
bequeathed to the surviving nb
t children’ of the oldest cohort. The period utility function for agents









































Thus, in the ﬁrst year of decision making, lifetime utility for the representative 18 year-old cohort











































































































The age distribution aﬀects household saving in two other key ways. First, relative cohort sizes
aﬀect intergenerational transfers. The saving rate increases when nt decreases because there will
be fewer workers paying to support retirees in the future. Second, retirees leave bequests and the
larger is the older generation, the more assets received by the current workers. Before examining
the quantitative importance of demographic change for aggregate saving, we present details on the
ﬁrm and the ﬁnancial intermediary.5
3.2 Firm







Parameter A measures total factor productivity (TFP), and α is the capital share. Labor is





Kt =( 1− δ)Kt−1 + It ,
where I is investment and capital depreciates at rate δ. The ﬁrm seeks to maximize proﬁts. As
such, the wage it pays is the marginal product of labor





5The value function of course also depends on which forms the exogenous portion of the state vector. We suppress
the notational dependence on the exogenous portion of the state vector and implicitly recognize that dependence
with the t subscript on the functions.







The rental rate is identiﬁed by the marginal product of capital from the Chinese data and the ﬁrm
adjusts its capital stock to satisfy this expression to equality.
3.3 Intermediation and Net Foreign Assets
The capital stock is ﬁnanced by an intermediary bank through foreign and domestic borrowing.
Let Ft be the number of internationally traded bonds held by the bank and Ni
t be the number of
people in cohort i at date t. The net foreign asset position equals the diﬀerence between deposits















Equilibrium consists of the ﬁrm hiring labor and renting capital to maximize proﬁts and each
consumer selecting consumption and assets to maximize utility. Since labor supply is exogenously
determined by the age distribution, the ﬁrm’s labor demand pins down the wage (w). We assume
the interest rate equals the marginal product of capital net of the depreciation rate. The national
demand and supply of assets need not be equal since the bank clears any excess on the international
capital market.
4 Parameterization
The economy of China during the time-span of our data has been one in transition. Our parame-
terization of the model accounts for this transitional nature in the settings for labor’s share (1−α)
and in adult children’s support (τ) for elderly parents. We begin with labor’s share.
Two features of labor’s share distinguishes China’s economy from most developed economies:
the share has declined over time and in recent years, has been comparatively low. Hu and Kahn’s
(1997) estimate of labor’s share during the post-reform era is 0.4 which is quite a bit lower than the
0.66 share exhibited in the U.S. Hsieh and Klenow (2009) examine data from 1998 to 2005 and ﬁnd
that the median labor share across all state-owned ﬁrms and large non state-owned (revenues in
excess of 5 million yuan) ﬁrms is 0.3. Table 3 shows our own estimates using the Chinese national
accounts data of labor’s share for selected years.6 As a result of the declining labor share, wage
growth has generally not kept pace with GDP growth in recent years.
6These estimates include nonwage compensation. Details of the methodology are given in the appendix.
9Table 3: Declining Labor Share
Year 1960 1970 1980 1995 2007
Labor share 0.64 0.57 0.59 0.53 0.48
Taking into account our own calculations and the estimates in the literature, we allow for the
declining labor share by setting 1 − α =0 .6 in the pre-reform years (1963-1978), then the share
decreases by 0.02 per year between the years of 1979 and 1988 until it reaches 0.4 where it remains
from 1989 onwards.
We now turn to the share of income τ transferred by workers to their elderly parents. A
traditional characteristic of the Chinese family system has been that children, especially males,
should care for their elderly parents. Presumably, the role of male children in this regard is a
primary factor that underlies the preference for boys and the resulting sex imbalance exploited by
Wei and Zhang (2009). Our parameterization of τ in the post-reform period is informed by the
following. Xie and Zhu (2009) use a survey conducted in 1998 to ﬁnd that the (unconditional)
fraction of income contributed by urban men to their parents is 0.03. Surprisingly, they found little
diﬀerence in the amounts given by urban women even though women earned substantially less than
men. The (unconditional) fraction of women’s income contributed was 0.06. Lee and Xiao (1998)
employ a 1992 survey of children’s support for elderly parents. Assuming a replacement rate of
0.66, their results imply an unconditional transfer rate of 0.082 in the urban areas. If broken down
by gender, the transfer rate is 0.037 for men and 0.16 for women. Information on the τ during the
pre-reform period is scarce. As noted by Lee and Xiao, in those days, most people lived in the rural
areas and belonged to collective production units with elderly persons receiving resources directly
from the collectives. We view the payments from the collectives as the transfer share and set τ to
be 0.12 in the pre-reform period. From 1979 to 1981, τ is reduced by 0.02 per year and remains
at 0.05 from 1982 onwards. We set the post-reform τ on the low side of the estimates because a
nontrivial proportion of adults in urban areas receive ﬁnancial support from their elderly parents
(Xie and Zhu (2009)).
We take the Barro-Becker children in utility parameters, µ =0 .65 and η =0 .76,f r o mM a n u e l l i
and Seshadri (2010). We set the time discount rate (β)t o0.99 and the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution (1/σ)t o0.53. The capital deprecation rate (δ)i ss e tt o0.10.T a b l e4s u m m a r i z e st h e
parameter values.
10Table 4: Baseline parameterization
Parameter Symbol Value Source
weight on children µ 0.65 Manuelli and Seshadri (2009)
concavity for children η 0.76 Manuelli and Seshadri(2009)
labor’s share of output pre-reforms (1 − α)0 .6 Author’s calculations
post-reforms 0.4
Hu and Khan (1997)
Hsieh and Klenow (2009)
Author’s calculations
transfer share pre-reforms τ 0.12
post-reforms 0.05
Lee and Xiao (1998)
Xie and Zhu (2009)
discount rate β 0.99 standard
coef. of relative risk aversion σ 1.9 standard
depreciation rate δ 0.10 standard
5 Results
Initial assets are set near zero. When we get to the end of the sample, the 18 year old agent needs
to look forward an additional 68 years to solve his/her problem in 2008. The future demographic
data come from the United Nations projections. Future wage and interest rate observations are
generated by assuming a gradual transition of the growth rate to a steady state rate of 2.0 percent
with a half-life of adjustment of 12 years.7 The 1950s in China were a time of massive policy
initiatives, reversals and disasters (e.g., the Great Leap Forward, the Great Famine). Due to the
volatility in the data at that time, we begin our simulation results after the Great Famine in 1963.
Our baseline simulation results using the parameterization from Table 4 are shown in Figure 5.
As in the data, the model exhibits relatively low saving rates before the mid 1970s and a sharply
rising saving rate around the time of the economic reforms. By 2008, the model generates a saving
rate of 0.25 which is only slightly less than the 0.27 rate in the data. The model generates the
saving boomlet and decline in the 1980s but does not exactly match up in terms of timing. From
1990 to 1995 the implied saving rate rises and matches the increase in the data. The saving rate in
the data continues to increase through 1999 and is then ﬂat until 2005. The model also generates
a ﬂat saving rate during those years, although at a lower level. The implied saving rate resumes
its upward trend from 2005 onward. In short, the model is able, with varying degrees of success,
to account for (i) the generally high rate of post-reform household saving, (ii) the trend break in
the saving rate, and (iii) cyclical ﬂuctuations in the saving rate.
Figure 6 shows 2009 saving rates by cohorts implied by the model. It displays the standard
hump shape with the saving rate reaching its maximum with the cohort in the last year of em-
ployment. Cohorts aged 80 and older dissave.
7Similarity to Chen et al.
11Several facets of the model contribute to generating the implied saving dynamics. We now
investigate the contributions of these factors by shutting oﬀ various features of the model.
Experiment 1 (Varying family size). See Figure 7. The line with ‘x’ markers is generated
by setting the parameter µ to zero, which kills oﬀ explicit valuation of dependent children’s con-
sumption in household utility. Chen et al. (2006) and Ferrero (2010) do not consider children’s
consumption, so this experiment compares closer to their models. Ignoring dependent children
causes the saving rate implied by the model to be too high and for most of the sample it overstates
the saving rate. The ‘no children’ saving rate starts increasing in 1970, prior to the acceleration
in the late 1970s in the data. It reaches a peak of 0.28 in 1979 then trends downwards from that
point. The ‘no children’ saving rate is too high and misses the timing of the trend breaks.
The series marked by inverted triangles is generated assuming a constant family size of n =2
children per (single head of) household. The economy with big families usually generates an
aggregate household saving rate that lies below our baseline rate. From 1964 to 1972, only a
trivial saving rate emerges. The implied timing of the trend reversals in the ‘big family’ economy
matches that of the baseline model. The conclusion from this experiment is that fewer (more)
children in the family causes households to behave as if they are more (less) patient.
To see why this occurs, let us return to the preferences of parents with dependent children, eq.
(3). Here, (cc
t)
1−σ /(1 − σ) is the per child utility which is scaled up by the function µ(nt)
η that
is increasing in the number of children in the household. Since household utility is increasing in
both the number of children nt and consumption per child cc
t,t h e r ea r et w of a c t o r st oi n c e n t i v e
larger families to expend resources on additional consumption instead of saving. The idea that
increasing the number of dependent children makes the household behave as if it is less patient is
formalized in










where ￿ βj is the eﬀective discount rate, such that







is decreasing in nt+j if σ<1 −
√
η or if σ>1+
√
η.8
The eﬀective discount factor under our parameterization of preferences is decreasing in n,s i n c e
σ =1 .9 > 1+
√
η =1 .87.
Experiment 2 (No bequest motive). Figure 8 shows the results from turning oﬀ the bequest
motive. Cohorts in the last period of life consume the entire value of their accumulated assets and
8We thank Joe Kaboski for suggesting Proposition 1. We note that Choi and Mark (2009) show that variation
in the time discount rate (β) across countries can explain the trending current accounts in Japan and the US. Our
model is consistent with the Choi and Mark hypothesis, in that diﬀerent age structures generate diﬀerent time
discount factors, as demonstrated by Proposition 1.
12income support obtained from their adult children. As can be seen, our baseline results are robust
to whether a bequest motive is in eﬀect or not.
Experiment 3. (Smoothed wages, reduced wage growth). See Figure 9. We ﬁrst smooth out
wage ﬂuctuations by passing the marginal product of labor through the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter.
The implied saving rate obtained when workers receive the HP trend of wages is shown with
‘x’ markers. Eliminating the cyclical ﬂuctuations in the wage does not impact the model in a
substantive way. The implied saving rate and implied trend breaks are very similar to those in the
baseline model. The series with triangle markers is generated by assuming that real wage growth
is reduced by 80 percent. As expected, low wage growth induces high saving rates.
Experiment 4 (Static expectations). In solving the model, we have assumed that households
have perfect foresight with respect to the evolution of the interest rate, wage, and demographics.
Outside of economics, this may strike one as a heroic assumption. Even within economics, perfect
foresight can seem a bit strong. A strongly contrasting assumption that we investigate is that
households form static expectations. In this experiment we assume at each date, the household
assumes that all future values of the exogenous variables are ﬁxed at currently observed values.
The results, displayed in Figure 10, show that assuming static expectations would be a poor
modeling choice. The implied saving rate is much too high and trends in the wrong direction after
the reforms. We conclude that while perfect foresight may be unrealistic, we draw on Friedman’s
(1966) recommendation to view agents as behaving as if they have perfect foresight but not that
they necessarily possess this attribute.
6 Conclusion
This paper studies the ability of standard life-cycle considerations to explain the evolution of
household saving in China from 1963 to 2008. Some of the more conspicuous facets of the saving
rate data that the model is able to account for include its relatively low level prior to the economic
reforms, its upward trend from 1978 to 2008, the cyclical drop and recovery of the saving rate in
the late 1980s and its current high level.
Two aspects of the model are central to the analysis: First, young dependent children enter
explicitly into household utility and second, the changing age distribution of the entire economy
is represented. The rapid rate of labor income growth in recent years works to depress household
savings. It thus follows from our analysis that the currently observed high saving rate is driven
primarily by the reduction in family size resulting from population control policies and the relatively
large size of the today’s working population.
Projecting forward, the model implies that as the Chinese population ages, and it is aging
quite rapidly, the rising household saving rate should be arrested. It should follow also that large
currently observed Chinese external surpluses, to the extent that they are driven by household
saving, may also be a temporary phenomenon.
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Figure 1: Household saving rate in China
















Figure 2: Demographic variation
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Figure 3: Saving rate and proportion of working population
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.2
Saving Rate and log Wage







Figure 4: Saving rate and log real wage












Figure 5: Baseline results











Saving Rates by Cohorts, 2009
Figure 6: Implied saving rates by cohort in 2009.
















Figure 7: Family size variation (experiment 1)















Figure 8: No Bequests (experiment 2)
















Figure 9: Variations on the real wage (experiment 3)














Figure 10: Static expectations (experiment 4)
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